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There has been a tremendous growth in the open-end investment com-
pany industry in recent years. Its total net assets currently approxi-
mate $30 billion, and its activities account for nearly six percent of
the overall trading on the New York Stock Exchange. The management of
the companies that constitute this industry is therefore a subject which
should be of considerable interest to the three million people who are
shareholders in these companies.
This subject is investigated by concentrating on four primary
areas of interest: (1) management and supervision of the investment
company portfolio by the investment company adviser, (2) the relation-
ship of investment company size to the management fee rate paid the
investment adviser, (3) the relationship of investment company size to
the operating expenses of the company (exclusive of management fee) and
(4) the relationship of investment company performance to the management
fee rate paid the investment adviser. Correlation analyses are per-
formed to determine these relationships, utilizing data excerpted from
current prospectuses and annual reports of representative samples of
the companies now in existence. These samples are selected through sta-
tistical techniques, and conclusions are drawn on the basis of these
analyses. The investment company shareholder's recent realization of
the inequities in management fee rates, which were discovered by this
study, are noted. Th« changes in the open-end investment company indus-
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The research upon which this document is based was focused upon the
management of open-end investment companies. The name "open-end" means
that companies so classified are virtually always repurchasing their
shares, and in consequence, are generally always issuing new shares.
These companies are more commonly known as "mutual funds", and the two
terms will be used interchangeably throughout this paper. They differ
from the other major category of investment company, the "closed-end",
primarily in the area of capitalization. Closed-end companies have a
relatively fixed number of shares outstanding, in contrast to the contin-
ually varying capital of open-end companies. Shares of open-end compan-
ies are acquired as new issues direct from the company, whereas those of
the closed-end company are available only from existing holders.
The idea of investment companies is not new. Investment companies
were in evidence in the early nineteenth century in Europe, and by 1860
had taken on much of the form in which we currently find them. The
United States had no comparable development until the mid- 1920' s. In
1924, with the creation of U. S. and Foreign Securities Corporation and
Massachusetts Investors Trust, the era of the investment company in the
United States commenced. U. S. and Foreign Securities was the forerunner
of the modern closed-end company, while Massachusetts Investors Trust
2
was the open-end pioneer.
1-Hugh Bullock, The Story of Investment Companies (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1959), p. 155.
^Rudolph L. Weissman, The Investment Company and The Invester (New
York: Harper and Brothers, 1951), p. 145.

The closed-end company was initially much more popular than the
open-end. During the speculative frenzy of the late 1920' s, there was a
whirlwind of activity relative to formulation of closed-end companies.
By the time of the 1929 market collapse, there were several hundred of
these companies with assets of approximately $7 billion. During the
same period, only 19 open-end companies had been organized; their assets
3totaled less than $200 million. The majority of the closed-end compan-
ies failed during the market crash. The open-end companies, of course,
experienced a drastic decline in asset values, as did all securities, in
the aftermath, but none of their holdings became completely worthless.
The 1929 debacle and the lean years following clearly demonstrated
the need for regulation in this area. The Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, over a four year period from 1936 to 1940, conducted an exhaus-
tive investigation into all matters relating to investment companies.
The result of this investigation was legislation in the form of the In-
vestment Company Act of 1940 (Public Law 768, 76th Congress). Even
though this law did not pertain directly to actual management policies,
practices and decisions, it was decisive in restoring public confidence
in investment companies.
Today, approximately 89 percent of the investment companies are
open-end, the remaining 11 percent being closed-end. Of more signifi-
cance is the fact that the activities of these open-end funds account for
nearly 6 percent of the over-all trading on the New York Stock Exchange. 5
3Arthur Wiesenberger, Investment Companies , Mutual Funds and Other
Types (New York: Arthur Wiesenberger and Company, 1964), p. 16.
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3The growth of the open-end investment companies can best be illustrated
by referring to Table I. In 1940, net asset value for all open-end com-
panies was $447,959,000. By 1963, it had grown to $25,214,436,000, an
increase of roughly 5,000 percent.
TABLE I
TOTAL NET ASSETS, 1940-1963a
(In 000' s of Dollars)

























wet asset figures are for those open-end investment
companies which are members of the Investment Company
Institute. They include substantially all mutual fund
assets.
Source: Arthur Wiesenberger and Company
The general feeling is that the following are the most significant
contributory factors in this phenomenal growth:
1. Vigorous merchandising by investment dealers has been prompted
by the financial rewards which accrue to the seller. Many brokerage
houses and investment banks have mutual funds as adjuncts to their

businesses. The Wharton Report6 is quite specific on this point:
In this connection, it may be noted that there is a significant
positive correlation between the size of the sales charge and the
rate of inflow of new money into the individual funds.
2. Public confidence in the safety of mutual funds, as a result of
federal legislation (i.e., the Investment Company Act of 1940), has been
dramatically demonstrated.
3. The general public has become more aware of the investment
merits of common stock; particularly as a hedge against inflation.
4. Institutional investors have given broad acceptance to stock
investment through mutual funds. Many small trustees, unable to estab-
lish their own research facilities, have come to rely on mutual funds.
I. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF MUTUAL FUND OWNERSHIP
In view of the broad general acceptance of mutual funds, it is felt
that a discussion of their advantages and disadvantages is pertinent
background material to the analyses which will be subsequently undertaken,
6The term "Wharton Report" refers to a study of the mutual fund in-
dustry, which was made by the Securities Research Unit of The Wharton
School of Finance and Commerce of the University of Pennsylvania. This
study began in late 1958 and was not concluded until August 1962. It
was prompted by the requirement of the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion for current information on certain aspects and practices of mutual
funds. The result was the most comprehensive analysis of the mutual
fund industry since the Securities and Exchange Commission's study made
prior to adoption of the Investment Company Act of 1940, some 20 years
before. It was subsequently presented to the Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce of the U. S. House of Representatives by the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission. It was ultimately published as House Re-
port No. 2274, 87th Congress, 2d Session. This document is commonly known
as the "Wharton Report," and will be referred to in this paper by this
title.
7U. S., House of Representatives, A Study of Mutual Funds , 87th
Congress, 2d Session, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, H.R.
2274(1962), p. XIII.

5Those covered herein are certainly not exhaustive, but appear to be the
ones which are generally accepted as consequential.
Advantages
Divers ification . Probably the most important single advantage--at
least the one with which almost all mutual fund investors are concerned—
is that of diversification. Some degree of risk is present in any use
of resources to produce income or as a means of increasing the monetary
value of those resources. The reduction of these risks, so far as is
reasonably possible, is the essence of investment management. ° Invest-
ment management is the reason for mutual funds. Diversification miti-
gates risk; stripped of refinements which add little or nothing to the
basic principle, diversification is the avoidance of putting too many
eggs in one basket. It is the maximization (within constraints peculiar
*
to the situation) of separation of risks that are inherent in different
industries, in different geographical areas and in different types of
issues.
Large investors are able to diversify by spreading their investment,
in appropriate depth, over a large number of issues so that loss in any
single issue or group of issues will have a minor effect on the overall
investment. Most investors--or at least most who would like to be in-
vestors—in the market cannot even be remotely considered in the large
investor category. Even those who might qualify cannot match the diver-
sification which is available to the smallest of the mutual funds.
Professional Management . Probably the second most sought after ad-





6unequipped, from the standpoint of time, training and experience, to
properly handle the job of selecting securities. Professional money man-
agers fill this void. They have access to information which is not
available to the average investor, and, on the whole, are able to make
more objective investments. In this connection, we might quote from the
late U. S. Supreme Court Justice Louis D. Brandeis:
The number of securities on the market is very large For a
small investor to make an intelligent selection from these many
corporate securities- -indeed, to pass an intelligent judgement upon
a single one--is ordinarily impossible. He lacks the ability, the
facilities, the training and the time essential to a proper investi-
gation. Unless his purchase is to be little better than a gamble,
he needs the advice of an expert, who combining special knowledge
with judgement, has the facilities and incentive to make a thorough
inve s tigation .
'
Convenience . Convenience is of particular significance to large
individual or institutional investors. There is the desirability of own-
ing shares in one or a few investment companies, as contrasted with a
lengthy list of individual securities. Record keeping is infinitely sim-
plified in that the mutual fund handles all the paper-work of securities
ownership. The following services, which are provided by mutual funds,
enhance the convenience advantage.
1. Automatic reinvestment of dividends.
2. Availability of contractural investment plans. Under this op-
tion, the investor is "locked- in" to an investment program once he begins
it. This is brought about by the requirement for payment of a dispropor-
tionately large part of the sales commission during the initial years of
the plan. For those who need such an incentive, this option is often
Louis D. Brandeis, Other People's Money (New York: Fred A. Stokes
Company, 1932), pp. 7-8.

7considered a convenience advantage. Plan completion insurance,, whereby
the investor can be sure that the investment plan will be completed in
the event of death, is normally a part of such plans.
3. Plans that provide for systematic withdrawals by the investor.
These are most attractive to more elderly investors who have a require-
ment on a monthly or quarterly basis for supplemental income for living
expenses.
Redemption . By federal law, mutual funds must redeem their shares
from an investor who so requests within seven days after the tender of
such security to the company or its designated redemption agent (except
for specified unusual situations). In actual practice, the average
time required for redemption is usually three to five days.
The redemption advantage has been the focus of some controversy that
might bear examination at this point. It revolves around the question of
what effect the feature has upon market price levels. The supporters of
mutual funds hold that they mitigate security price fluctuations and sta-
bilize the market. Those who do not favor the funds claim that the unso-
phisticated mutual fund investor, during a recession, would rush, by the
millions, to redeem their shares; thus causing a situation analogous to a
"run" on a bank. They maintain therefore that this feature is a constant
deterrent to market stability.
The facts in the matter clearly favor the fund supporters. Mutual
funds could only contribute to a market decline or collapse in the event
that they were forced to sell their portfolio securities. A requirement
10
U. S. Congress, Investment Company Act of 1940 ;, Public Law 768
Congress, 3d Session, Title I, Investment Companies 9 1940 9 H. R.76th
10065, p. 28.

8for sale of securities infers a need for capital. The mutual fund has
three sources for capital: (1) uninvested cash, (2) sales of new shares,
(3) sales of securities.
The first source, uninvested cash, is available to meet redemptions.
It would be relatively insignificant, however, in the event of acceler-
ated redemptions, in that funds do not normally maintain liquidity at a
level much higher than that required for normal operations.
The second source, from sales of new shares, is by far the most im-
portant source. The history of fund operations, almost from their incep-
tion in this country, substantiates this without exception. Table II
shows that new sales have always exceeded redemptions by a ratio of 1.5:1
or better. This was true even in the 1930 's when the securities market
was prostrated as a result of the 1929 collapse. There were sharp market
declines in 1957, 1960 and 1962 (the Dow-Jones Industrial Average ended
more than 10 percent lower than it began in these years). Despite this,
sales of mutual fund shares exceeded redemptions by better than a 2 to 1
ratio.
These statistics clearly indicate that mutual funds are not likely
to have to resort to portfolio liquidations to meet redemption demands
during severe market declines. Quite the contrary, the high ratio of pur-
chases to redemptions during these periods would tend to establish the
funds as market stabilizers.
In view of the foregoing evidence, a discussion of the third capital
source would seem superfluous. Even if portfolio liquidation should ever
become a necessity, it is normally sufficiently diversified to enable
selective and orderly disposition of relatively small blocks of various
securities and would not involve distress selling of all holdings of an

TABLE II
SALES AND REDEMPTIONS OP OWN SHARES BY MUTUAL
INVESTMENT FUNDS 19 2 7- 19 36 , I9UI-I963
(in thousands of dollars)
Yoar Gross Sales Redemptions Net Sales Ne. Funds
1927 * 15,905 $ 1,992 $ 13,913 40
1928 38,210 7,798 30,412 40
19 29 86,364 20,621 65,743 40
1930 28,820 • 15,031 13,789 40
1931 21,548 11,595 9,953 40
1932 26,388 8,347 22,041 40
1933 81,583 11,720 69,863 40
193^ 68,947 19,293 49,654 40
1935 85,781 17,485 68,296 40
1936 110,600 28,533 82,067 40
19 4l 53,312 45,024 8,288 68
I9U2 73,140 25,440 47,700 68
I9U3 116,062 51,221 64,841 68
1?M» 169,288 70,815 98,413 68
19U5 292,228 109,978 182,381 73
19 46 370,353 143,612 226,741 74
19 47 266,924 88,732 178,192 80
1948 273,787 127,161 146,616 87 *
19 49 385,526 107,587 277,939 91
19 50 518,811 280,728 238,083 98
1951 674,610 321,550 353,060 103
1952 782,902 196,022 586,880 110
1953 672,902 238,778 ^ 433,227 110
195^ 862,817 399,702 463,115 115
1955 1,207,458 442,550 764,908 125
1956 1,346,738 432,750 913,988 135
1957 1,390,557 405,716 983,841 143
19 58 1,619,768 511,263 1,108,505 151
1959 2,279,982 785,627 1, 494,355
1,255,431
155
i960 2,097,246 841,815 161
1961 2,950,860 1,160,357 1,790,503 170
1962 2,699,049 1,122,695 1,576,35^ 169
1963 2,459,105 1,505,335 953,770 165
Seuroes: l927-1936--Seouriti es and Exchange Commission Report to Congress on
Investment Trusts and Investment Companies, Part II, p. 265, Table 8l(1939)«
1937-194o--Not Available. 194l-1963--Arthur Wiesenberger 4 Company. Data pertain





Of further interest in connection with mutual fund advantages is a
survey which was conducted in 1958 by the National Association of Invest-
ment Companies* They sent questionnaires to several thousand regular
12
account holders. These questionnaires listed the four primary fund
ownership advantages, which have just been under discussion, and requested
the account holder to indicate which of the four he personally considered
to be the greatest advantage to him. Each sample was mutually exclusive-
-
that is, if he chose one of the four, he automatically excluded the other
three. Certain other data were also included in the questionnaire to en-
able classification of the respondent.
Responses were received from about 1500, representing approximately
20 percent of those queried. Table III summarizes the results of the sur-
vey. The data therein are self explanatory.
Disadvantages
Sales Charge . Over four-fifths of the mutual funds currently sell
their shares at net asset value plus a sales commission or loading charge.
The size of the commission varies between companies and by size of pur-
chase, but it is typically seven to nine percent of the total selling
price of the shares for purchases up to $25,000 in size, with a gradual
decline thereafter. They are characteristically sold through a principal
underwriter, who in turn sells the shares to a selling group of retail
dealers. The sales charge is split between the principal underwriter and
^Dorsey Richardson, The Investment Companies in 1955 ; Their Rela -
tionship to the Nation's Securities Markets (New York; National Associa-
tion of Investment Companies, 1955), p. 21.
^Regular account holders are those who have made a lump sum invest-
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retailer, with the latter usually getting between two- thirds and seven-
13
eighths of the total. Table IV illustrates the procedure that is uti-
lized in the calculation of the offering price of mutual fund si
where a loading charge is assessed.
This fairly high initial cost is considered by some t© be a disad-
vantage. Interestingly enough, however, the Wharton Report indicates
that the sales charge is in fact a bargain to the average investor. It
states that the major function served by mutual funds is the provision of
diversification and that the degree of diversification provided by the
funds could be procured by the average investor only at an acquisition
cost in excess of this charge.
TABLE IV
COMPUTATION OF BID PRICE, SALES CHARGE AND OFFERING PRICE
OF OPEN-END INVESTMENT COMPANY STOCK
Account Amount
Investments at market $215 9 252 a 851
Cash and other assets
.
. 10 9 508 .,646
Total. 225 , 761 ,497
Liabilities 4,503,784
Net assets at market--for 18,928,770.7 shares outstanding 221,257,713
Net asset value and redemption price (bid price)
per share $221,257,713 s $n. 69
18,928,770.7
Offering price per share —j^r of $11.69 $12.71
Effective sales charge per share (8.0% of actual offering price) $ 1.02
Source; Prospectus, Fidelity Capital Fund, 23 March 1965.
13
Edward S. Herman, "Mutual Fund Management Fee Rates/' The Journal
of Finance, XVIII (May, 1963), 362, 363.





Management Fees and Other Operating Expenses . Management fees and
other operating expenses are two of the main topics of this paper and
will be treated thoroughly in later chapters. It should be noted here,
however, that the investor is currently paying in the neighborhood of
$120 million per annum in fees for the management of approximately $30
billion in net assets, and the expense of actually operating the funds
acts to cause a further reduction in the return on his investment.
Overdiversification . Much has already been said regarding diversi-
fication as the primary advantage of the funds. While this is undoubtedly
true, it should also be noted that while diversification limits risk, it
also limits opportunity. Therefore, excessive diversification is consid-
ered by some to be a disadvantages due to its restrictive effect on
profit opportunity.
Tax on Capital Gains Distribution . The owner of shares of stock in
companies listed on the stock exchange has the option of selling or keep-
ing shares issued to him as a capital gains distribution. He pays no
tax when he retains them. By contrast, the mutual fund shareholder does
not have this prerogative. He must pay the capital gains tax regardless
of whether he takes the distribution in additional shares or in cash.
II. PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY
In attempting to formulate a plan for research into the management
of mutual funds, there was a temptation to attempt a study to develop in-
formation related to all matters impinging upon this subject. Initial
investigation revealed that such a task could not be meaningfully accom-
plished in the time allotted and with the research facilities available.
Accordingly, it was decided to concentrate on four primary areas of
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inquiry in the hope of developing information which would lead to valid
conclusions that might be useful to those interested in the subject. The
four areas selected are:
1. Management and supervision of the fund portfolio.
2. The relationship of mutual fund size to management compensation.
3. The relationship of mutual fund size to operating expense.
4. The relationship of performance to management compensation.
The first of these areas is covered in Chapter II. Special emphasis
is given to the security selection process which is usually delegated by
a mutual fund to an investment advisory firm. The subject of management
fees, which has already been briefly mentioned, is thoroughly examined.
Advisory contracts are discussed.
Chapter III is concerned with the second and third areas. Management
compensation and other operating expenses are defined , for purposes of
this study, to avoid confusion regarding comparisons that are made. A
procedure for securing the required mutual fund sample was designed,
using modern statistical techniques. Data relating to fund size., manage-
ment compensation and operating expense were then drawn from the current
prospectuses and/or annual reports of the companies selected in the sam-
ple. They were correlated in an effort to determine the effect (if any)
of fund size on operating expense and management compensation.
Chapter IV is concerned with the fourth area. The problems related
to measuring fund performance were examined and a procedure for doing so
was developed. An additional sample of ten common stock funds and ten
balanced funds was taken. These companies were correlated to determine
the relationship (if any) between management compensation and fund per-
formance.




A mutual fund is usually organized as a corporation, with a board
of directors and with a group of officers responsible for its routine
activities. The vast majority of the funds enter into contracts with
investment advisers, who agree to provide investment advice and perform
various other administrative services for a prescribed fee. Only a
small percentage are managed exclusively by their boards of directors or
trustees and their own full-time officers. These investment advisers are
commonly known as mutual fund management companies. The terms management
company and investment adviser are
s
for the purposes of this study, syn-
onymous and will be used interchangeably throughout this paper. Addi-
tionally, since this paper is concerned only with open-end investment
companies, the term investment company, where appearing, should be taken
to mean an open-end investment company. This chapter will be concerned
primarily with;
1. The legal relationship between the investment company and its
investment adviser. This is a function of federal legislation (Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940) and the advisory and service contract between
the investment company and the adviser.
2. The actual management procedures employed in controlling the
fund portfolio.
Edward S. Herman, "Mutual Fund Management Fee Rates," The Journal
of Finance, XVTII (May, 1963), 362.
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I. THE LEGAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE MANAGEMENT
COMPANY AND THE INVESTMENT COMPANY2
The Investment Company Act of 1940 establishes certain standards of
corporate and inter-corporate structure and disclosure, prescribes and
regulates relationships and transactions between investment companies
and affiliated persons, of which the investment adviser is ©ne s and, to
a limited extent, regulates other operations. Its enforcement is dele-
gated to the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Under section 10(a) of the Act, no investment company may have a
board of directors more than 60 percent of whom are officers or employees
of the company, or investment advisers, or persons affiliated with the
investment adviser. Section 15 of the Act provides that investment ad-
visory contracts must originally be approved by a vote of the investment
company's stockholders, and shall continue in effect for a period of more
than two years after execution only so long as approved at least annually
either (1) by a majority of directors who are not parties to the invest-
ment contract or affiliated persons of any such party or (2) by a vote
of the stockholders. The contract must provide, in substance, that it
may be terminated by the investment company at any time on not more than
sixty days written notice, and that it terminates automatically in the
event of its assignment by the investment adviser. In the case of a cor-
porate adviser, assignment includes, by definition, the transfer of a
controlling block of the outstanding voting securities by one or more
stockholders of an investment advisory company.
Data in this section regarding the statutory provisions of the
Investment Company Act of 1940 were taken from the Act itself.
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The termination provision is an important one in that, before enact-
ment of this statute, investment advisory contracts would often run for
long periods and would be sold to a new and sometimes less desirable group
of men without shareholders having anything to say about the investment
3
company coming under new supervision.
Section 15 also requires that contracts between management companies
and mutual funds fulfill certain specific conditions regarding the com-
pensation to be paid to the adviser by the fund. This requirement has
two facets: (1) the fee to be charged by the management company for its
advisory service and the method which will be used to compute it, and (2)
those other operating expenses of the fund, if any, that are to be assumed
by the management company as a part of the service provided under the man-
agement fee.
The Wharton Report provides some highly illuminating data regarding
these two points. The data concerning the first point were developed
on the basis of information submitted by 174 mutual funds and their in-
vestment advisers in response to a questionnaire sent them by the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission in December, 1960. Table V contains the
information developed. It will be noted that the vast majority (94.2
percent) of the funds queried have contracts that provide for computa-
tion of management fees solely on the basis of fund asset size. In most
of these cases (79.3 percent), they are an invariant percentage of fund
3Hugh Bullock, The Story of Investment Companies (New York: Colum-
bia University Press, 1959), p. 86.
U. S., House of Representatives, A Study of Mutual Funds , 87th
Congress, 2d Session, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, H.R.




MANAGEMENT FEE-RATE TYPES FOR ADVISORY SERVICES TO
OPEN-END INVESTMENT COMPANIES, 1960
Fee Types Number of Companies Percent
Flat percentage of fund assets
Scaled percentage of fund assets













Source: Securities and Exchange Commission (Wharton Report)
assets; but in a substantial (14.9 percent) number of instances they are
calculated according to a scale which declines as assets grow. The lat-
ter category also includes those companies which calculate on the basis
of declining percentage of assets and investment income. There were a
few instances (2.9 percent) in which the fee was calculated as a fixed
percentage (usually 6 percent) of gross investment income. The remainder
of those queried (2.9 percent) utilized somewhat exotic or at least un-
common methods and were lumped into an "other" classification.
In recent years, there has been increasing criticism of the manage-
ment companies regarding their methods for computing management fees, be-
cause these fees have remained static in spite of the enormous increase
in total assets of the funds managed. This criticism has been based pri-
marily upon the contention that the costs of portfolio management do not
increase in direct proportion to the assets of the portfolio, since econo-
mies of scale must eventually influence operations. For this reason,
5
"Personal Investing," Fortune, LXX (December, 1964), 83.
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the 14.9 percent figure developed for mutual funds which pay management
fees on the basis of a declining scale is of particular interest. It
establishes that there has been a noticeable increase in recent years in
c.
the number of companies that are now utilizing this method. Chapter
III will deal with this aspect of management fees-- the relationship of
the fee to the net asset size of the fund.
Regarding the second point, services, other than advisory, that are
provided by the management company for the management fee, the Wharton
Report has the following comments:
There is considerable variation in industry practice as regards
the allocation of administrative duties and expenses between the
investment adviser and the investment company. In some cases, the
adviser serves exclusively in an advisory capacity, often with
another organization serving as manager; in other cases advisers
perform all, or absorb the entire cost of, administrative or
"housekeeping" activities connected with the operations of an open-
end investment company; and most advisers fall somewhere between
these extremes.
The report also compiled meaningful statistical data on the basis
of information submitted by 232 Investment managers in response to ques-
tionnaires. Table VI summarizes this information.
It may be seen from Table VI that for between 60 and 80 percent of
the 232 open-end companies, the advisers paid entirely for housing the
investment company, clerical and bookkeeping expenses, accounting serv-
ices, officers' salaries, and the determination of offering and redemp-
tion prices. For between 30 and 50 percent of the companies, directors'
fees, the cost of stationery, supplies and printing, and registration








ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES PERFORMED OR PAID FOR
BY INVESTMENT ADVISERS, 1960
Number of open-end contpanies
Service Service Service pro-
Service fully partially vided in
provided provided whole or
in part
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
Occupancy and office rental 179 77.2 5 2.2 184 79.3
Clerical and bookkeeping 170 73.3 14 6.0 184 79.3
Officers' salaries 158 68.1 28 12.1 186 80.2
Determination of offering
and redemption price 151 65.1 .0 151 65.1
Accounting 140 60.3 6 2.6 146 62.9
Directors' fees 107 46.1 37 15.9 144 62.1
Stationery, supplies and
printing 96 41.4 50 21.6 146 62.9
Registration and filing 72 31.0 16 6.9 88 37.9
Reports to stockholders 37 15.9 21 9.1 58 25.0
Legal fees 34 14.7 27 11.6 61 26.3
Cost of annual meeting 28 12.1 1 .4 29 12.5
Auditing 28 12.1 14 6.0 42 18.1
Transfer agent fees 26 11.2 .0 26 11.2
Custodian fees 19 8.2 .0 19 8.2
Cost of disbursing dividends 19 8.2 1 .4 20 8.6
Source: Securities and Exchange Commission (Wharton Report)
percent of the companies, the investment adviser supplied or paid for all
expenses connected with reporting to stockholders, legal actions, annual
meetings, auditing, transfer agent, custodial and dividend disbursing
activities. In many cases, as may be seen in columns 3 and 4 of Table VI,
the adviser provided only part of the cost of a service. Columns 5 and 6
give the number and percentage of cases in which the service in question
was provided by the adviser in whole or in part.
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We can see from column 2 that a majority of companies were pro-
vided fully with only the first five services. In column 6 9 it may be
seen that a majority of open-end companies are provided in whole or in
part with seven services. In addition to occupancy, clerical and
accounting services, officers' salaries, and the determination of re-
demption prices, directors' fees and stationery, supplies and printing
round out the seven services. Directors' fees are typically a minor
expense, and stationery, supplies and printing are usually reported ex-
clusive of the expenses involved in transmitting various kinds of reports
to stockholders. The latter appears to be a substantial expense , and as
may be seen in Table VI, it is usually left for payment by the invest-
ment company.
II. MANAGING THE FUND PORTFOLIO
Calvin Bullock Ltd. has been chosen as an example of a typical in-
vestment advisory company for the purpose of illustrating the management
process. Its procedures will be contrasted with those of the Broad
Street Group of funds, to provide an idea of some of the differences in
approach to management that are found in the investment company field
today.
Calvin Bullock, Ltd. manages four mutual funds, which had combined
net assets of $578.1 million in 1964. Table VII provides a breakdown of
net assets and management fees for each fund which Calvin Bullock super-
vised in 1964.
There are several levels in the decision-making process. At the
top level is the Board of Directors composed of distinguished representa-
tives of the fields of business, law and finance. In total there are
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eight directors, and it is their job to establish the broad policies of
the fund. They function in an advisory and supervisory capacity and not
in an administrative capacity. They do not ordinarily recommend specific
security transactions, for such is regarded to be within the sphere of
the investment advisory firm.
TABLE VII
NET ASSETS AND MANAGEMENT COSTS FOR THE BULLOCK
GROUP OF MUTUAL FUNDS, FISCAL 1964
srName of
Fund
Net Assets Management Fee
(in millions) (in thousands)
Management Fee






Total for Four Funds





Management fee does not include the salaries of directors not affili-
ated with the investment management company, Calvin Bullock, Ltd.
Source: Annual Reports
No compensation is paid by the company to any of its directors or
officers who are also directors, officers or employees of Calvin Bullock
Ltd. , which is obligated to pay such compensation. Other directors re-
ceive annually an aggregate of approximately $12,000 as remuneration
Q
from the company for their services.
One of the most important of those services rendered by the direc-
tors is to act as intermediaries between the investment counsel firm,
8
Prospectus, Bullock Fund, March 29, 1965, p. 2.
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Calvin Bullock , Ltd. and corporations having investment potential. The
directors are usually well known and can arrange meetings between the
security analysts of the counsel organization and high-level corporation
executives. Such meetings serve a very useful purpose, which is to give
members of the research staff more information on which to base their
investment decisions.
Below the Board of Directors there exists an advisory committee com-
posed of from three to five members who are usually board members, and
it is their function to define and refine the broader policy conclusions
of the board with respect to the degree of defensive or aggressive meas-
9
ures that are recommended to the administrators of the portfolio. The
advisory committee's function is advisory and not administrative.
The management of the portfolio is the job of the management organi-
zation, and the final decision with respect to the actual selection of
securities for purchase and sale is left to the head of the investment
management department and his deputies, thus influencing more decisive
action and more effective administration.
The portfolio administrator has the final responsibility for plac-
ing individual orders for purchases and sales based on the board and
advisory committee's policies and on the studies and recommendations of
the research department. He is assisted in discharging this responsi-
bility by the economist and the senior member of the research staff, who
act as his deputies.
9Harold Aul, "Investment Company Portfolio Management," The Commer -
cial and Financial Chronicle




Under the portfolio administrator there are several research depart-
ments. Each department is headed by a senior analyst who is given the
necessary statistical and clerical assistance.
In addition to its own studies, the organization makes use of a
11
wide range of outside facilities. These facilities include;
1. Company reports and field trips.
2. Data from all the principal statistical agencies.
3. Pertinent government reports.
4. Specialized studies of economic organizations.
5. Reports of the research departments of certain ©f the leading
brokerage and investment banking organizations.
In contrast to the management procedure of the Bullock Group of
funds (which is the most prevalent), a unique arrangement for securing
investment research and administrative services on a non-profit , low
cost basis has been devised by four investment companies. The four com-
panies are National Investors Corporation, Broad Street Investing Cor-
poration, Whitehall Fund and Tri-Continental Corporation. They operate
a research and administrative organization for their mutual benefit.
This organization, Union Service Corporation, is one of the largest of
its kind with about 110 employees and expenses budgeted for the current
year at over $1.2 million. It is owned by these four companies. It has
12
no outside clients, institutional or individual.
The aggregate compensation received by the officers of the four in-
vestment companies and the cost of operating Union Service are shared by
11
Ibid ., 34.




them in the ratio of the current value of the assets of each company to
the value of the combined assets of the four. No management or invest-
13
ment advisory fees are paid.
The advantages of such an arrangement are readily apparent from
Table VIII. Investment management and administrative expenses and offi-
cers' compensation , as a percentage of net assets, is extremely low in
relation to the basic annual fee rates typically paid by mutual funds
for management and investment advisory services. This can be seen by a
comparison of Table VIII with Table VII. The funds utilizing Union Serv-
ice Corporation spent, on the average , during fiscal year 1964, only 37
percent as much on management expense as did those utilizing Calvin Bul-
lock, Ltd; and it should be noted that Bullock is by no means the most
expensive management company in the industry.
The funds of the Broad Street Group, through their use of Union Serv-
ice Corporation, realize substantially greater facilities than they could
independently. The cost is also much lower than if they maintained their
own organization. The reason for this is, of course, that Union Service
Corporation provides its services to the funds at cost, thus eliminating
the profit margin required by the investment management company. Funds
such as those of the Bullock Group, which employ an investment management
company, must pay not only the costs of managing, but a profit to the
manager as well.
14
The management procedure for the Broad Street Group is somewhat
l^Annual Report, Broad Street Investing Corporation , January 19,
1965, p. 10.
l^The discussion in the remainder of this chapter relating to the
Broad Street Group and the Union Service Corporation is based upon mate-
rial presented in a pamphlet published by the Broad Street Sales Corpo-
ration entitled Investment Research and Administration For the Broad
Street Group of Mutual Funds .
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different from that of the Bullock Group. Like the Bullock Group, each
fund of the Broad Street Group is controlled by a Board of Directors
which is elected by the shareholders. The directors are responsible for
the policies they establish and for the overall results of the fund.
TABLE VIII
NET ASSETS AND MANAGEMENT COSTS FOR THE BROAD STREET









Cost as a "L
of Net Assets
Broad Street Investing
Corp. $341.4 $349.7 0.107.
National Investors Corp. 429.5 443.8 0.10
Whitehall Fund 17.2 18.3 0.10
Total for Three Funds $788.1 $811.8 0.107.
aThe research facilities of Union Service Corporation are also shared by
Tri-Continental Corporation. Tri-Continental is a closed-end investment
company and by virtue of this fact, computations regarding it have not
been included in this table.
Includes investment and administrative expenses, plus officers' compen-
sation.
Source: Annual Reports
A difference between the two groups appears, however, at the next
level. Where the companies of the Bullock Group have advisory committees,
those of the Broad Street Group have executive committees. The executive
committee is much more powerful, having about the same function as the
advisory committee and portfolio administrator combined. It was seen in
the discussion of the Bullock Group that the advisory committee functioned
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only to refine and define the broader policies which were formulated by
the board of directors , and the decisions regarding adjustments in the
portfolio were the responsibility of the portfolio administrator. In
the Broad Street Group the executive committee acts in both these capac-
ities. The Broad Street Group therefore evidences a predilection for
group judgement in making decisions regarding which securities are to be
bought and sold, when, and in what amounts. Whereas, the Bullock Group
does not believe in committee management of portfolios, but looks to the
head of the investment management department and his deputies to imple-
ment the declared policies and objectives , basing his selections on the
studies of the research department.
Organizationally, the Union Service Corporation functions directly
below the executive committees of the member investment companies. As
mentioned earlier, it consists of approximately 110 employees. It func-
tions primarily through a research staff, which is coordinated by invest-
ment committees. These committees perform a number of functions; they:
(1) plan staff work, (2) review investment findings, (3) recommend invest-
ments, (4) direct the research staff, (5) review research staff findings
and (6) bring forward investment recommendations for decision.
Departmentalization is not as extensive in Union Service as it is
in Bullock. The three investment research departments of Union Service
and their functions ares
1. Economics Department . Responsible for surveys and forecasts of
economic conditions.
2. Investment Research Department. Develops information through
15Aul, o£. cit. , 9
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the study of investment prospects in many industries to provide a basis
for selection of securities best suited for meeting fund objectives.
3. Market Department . Continuously studies conditions in the se-
curities market. Supervises the purchase and sale of securities which
have been chosen by the executive committees of the member investment
companies.
A basic understanding of the legal relationship between the invest-
ment adviser and the investment company and also, in general, of the
methods employed in the industry to provide investment management and
administrative services to the individual funds will be of value to the
reader in grasping the material to be presented in the succeeding chap-
ters. It is hoped that this chapter has accomplished that purpose.

CHAPTER III
THE RELATIONSHIP OF MUTUAL FUND SIZE TO MANAGEMENT COMPENSATION
AND OTHER OPERATING EXPENSES
Other than taxes on capital gains and dividends , the cost ©f owning
mutual fund shares, subsequent to acquisition, is represented
operating expenses of the fund. These expenses are passed on
shareholder through a reduction in the net assets of the c<
consequently in the bid price for each share of stock in that
by an amount equal to these expenses. For purposes of this study , these
expenses have been divided into two categories: (1) management compen-
sation and (2) other operating expenses.
It was noted in Chapter II that there is considerable variation
throughout the industry regarding the services that are provided by an
investment management company in return for the fee which it receives
from a fund which it manages. This situation dilutes the value of any
comparison of mutual funds on the basis of management fees. Accordingly,
it was decided that the comparison, in part, would be made on the basis
of an arbitrary grouping of operating expenses which were common to all
the funds considered. This grouping was referred to as management com-
pensation. All operating expenses then remaining, after separation ©f
those constituting management compensation, were then referred t© 9 col-
lectively, as other operating expenses. The allocation of operating ex-
penses between these two categories was as follows;
1. Management Compensation
a. All fees for investment advice and assistance
b. Officers" salaries
c. Directors' fees -
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d. Occupancy and office rental
2. Other Operating Expenses . All remaining operating expenses
such as
:
a. Clerical and bookkeeping
b. Determination of offering and redemption
c. Accounting
d. Stationery, supplies and printing
e. Reports to stockholders
f. Legal fees
g. Transfer agent fees
h. Custodian fees
i. Cost of disbursing dividends
j. Taxes
Since operating expense constitutes the principal recurring cost to
the mutual fund shareholder, an attempt to ascertain the relationship
between it and the size of mutual funds, as measured by net assets, was
considered pertinent. Correlation between fund size and management com-
pensation should provide meaningful information regarding the costs of
management services. One would expect that as substantial increases in
fund assets are realized, the economies of scale would enable the manage-
ment company to provide its services to the fund at a smaller overall
fee rate. Whether this is in fact true is considered, along with other
factors, to be information of significant value to the prospective mutual
fund investor in the selection of a company in which to invest his money.
Correlation between fund size and other operating expense should
also provide valuable information regarding the efficiency of the fund
in conducting those operations which are not controlled and paid for by
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the management company. Again, one would expect those companies with
large net asset values, through the advantages of economies of scale
s to
be able to operate at a lower expense ratio (i.e., other operating ex-
pense :net assets).
This chapter will provide an answer to these two questions through
statistical analysis. An appropriate sampling procedure was designed a
and a sample of thirty mutual funds was selected. The aforementioned
variables (net assets, management compensation and other operating ex-
penses) were correlated by means of scatter diagrams. The results and
a
conclusions are as noted herein.
I. SIZE OF MANAGEMENT COMPANIES
The Investment Company Act of 1940 requires that registered invest-
ment companies must have a net worth of at least $100,000. This require-
ment is based on the premise that a minimum size of $100,000 tends to
discourage irresponsible promoters from establishing mutual funds. It
also insures that these funds have the ability to at least afford ade-
quate research facilities. Small investment companies often are not
able to support a suitable research effort because they find it diffi-
cult to afford the price required by a full-time advisory concern. There
is an alternative to hiring an investment manager for the mutual fund,,
and that is to conduct their own research. However, the adequacy of
such research is also dependent upon the fund being able to pay the
price necessary to create suitable facilities of their own.
It should be emphasized that the $100,000 minimum size by no means
represents optimum mutual fund size, but only acts as a lower protective
limit for the investor. Russel Doane and Edward J. Hills point this out
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in their book s Investment Trusts and Funds ;
Ordinarily we do not recommend investment companies having total
assets of less than about $105,0005,000. The annual administrative
and accounting expenses of smaller organizations tend to be a rela-
tively large proportion of net income. Also., in order to obtain
the full-time services of competent investment advisers, a manage-
ment fee of at least $50 , 000 (one-half of one percent of $10,000,
000) would be needed. A smaller management fee may be adequate if
the fund is managed as an adjunct to a large Investment advisory
business.!
There is no specific requirement governing maximum size, although
the Investment Company Act of 1940
s
Section 14(b) states?
The commission is authorized , at such times as it deems that any
substantial further increase in size of investment companies cre-
ates any problem involving the protection of investors or the pub-
lic interest, to make a study and investigation of the effects of
size on the investment policy of investment companies and on
security markets 9 on concentration of control of wealth and indus-
try, and on companies in which investment companies are interested,
and from time to time to report the results of its studies and in-
vestigations and its recommendations to the Congress.
II. DESIGNING THE SAMPLE
Wiesenberger currently lists 236 mutual funds which he classifies
3
as common stock, balanced and specialty. It was felt that the results
from an analysis of all of these companies would not have been commensu-
rate with the effort required to do it. Accordingly, the technique of
stratified proportional random sampling was decided upon.
*C. Russel Doane and Edward J. Hills, Investment Trusts and Funds
(Great Barrington, Massachuaettsj American Institute for Economic Re-
search, 1958), p. 52.
2U. S. Congress, Investment Company Act of 1940 , Public Law 768,
76th Congress, 3d Session, Title I, Investment Companies, 1940, H.R.
10065, p. 19.
Arthur Wiesenberger, Investment Companies
,
Mutual Funds and Other





Stratified proportional random sampling is of value when a sample
is required from a finite heterogeneous universe which has groupings
within it which are themselves homogeneous. These groupings are re-
ferred to as strata. The precision of an estimate is improved when it
is arrived at by taking individual simple random samples from each stra-
tum rather than by employing a single simple random sample of the same
4
total size from the entire universe. Additionally, where proper repre-
sentation of the variables considered most important is necessary, the
precision is further improved by selecting samples from each stratum
which bear the same relationship in size to the total sample desired as
the strata bear to the universe. Another factor of the utmost importance
is sample size. Sample size too is a function of the degree of preci
required. It also depends upon the variability of the data being sampled,
5
the sampling method used and the type of estimating procedure used.
In this instance, the universe consisted of the aforementioned 236
mutual funds. It was divided into three strata according to whether
investment company was classified as a common stock fund, a balanced
fund or a specialty fund. The common stock stratum contained 165 com-
panies, the balanced stratum 45 companies and the specialty stratum 26
companies. Their proportions of the universe were therefore .70, .19
and .11 respectively.
Stratification was accomplished according co basic policy on the
premise that a fund's basic portfolio composition might well influence
Morris J. Slonim, Sampling in a Nutshell (New York; Simon and
Schuster, 1960), p. 52.
Earl K. Bowen, Statistics With Applications in Management and
Economics (Homewood, Illinois; Richard D. Irwin, Inc., I960), p. 72.
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its management fee and consequently its total expenses. The decision to
sample on a proportional basis was predicated on the requirement for pro-
per representation of the variables from each stratum.
It was decided that thirty companies would constitute the sample
(thirteen percent of the universe). Twenty-one funds were selected
from the common stock strata, six from the balanced and three from the
specialty, representing the same relationship to the total sample as
their respective strata did to the universe. It was felt that this size
sample would provide a representation of sufficient accuracy to enable
meaningful interpretation of the results. It was also considered, how-
ever, that it could not be made much smaller because of the variability
in size of the funds, as determined by net assets. The largest fund in
the sample was Television and Electronics Fund, with net assets of $396.6
million. The smallest was Florida Growth Fund, Inc., with net assets of
$5.4 million.
A table of random numbers was used to insure that the sample se-
lee ted was in fact random. In those instances where current information
concerning a company which had been initially selected in the sample was
unavailable, another selection was made from the universe using the same
random number table.
III. COMPILATION OF PERTINENT DATA
After the sample had been taken, the prospectuses and annual reports
for all companies in the sample, for fiscal year 1964, were secured.
Data regarding net assets, management compensation, other operating
6CRC Standard Mathematical Tables , 13th ed. (Cleveland, Ohio; The
Chemical Rubber Company, 1964), p. 245.

35
expenses, and investment income were excerpted for each company. Compu-
tations were made to determine: (1) management compensation, as a per-
centage of net assets, (2) other operating expense , as a percentage of
net assets, (3) management compensation, as a percentage of investment
income, and (4) other operating expense, as a percentage of investment
income. The results are presented in Table IX.
IV. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MUTUAL FUND SIZE AND
MANAGEMENT COMPENSATION
To determine and illustrate what, if any, relationship existed be-
tween the variables, mutual fund size (as measured by net assets) and
management compensation, a scatter diagram, utilizing appropriate data
from Table IX, was constructed. This diagram is presented as Figure 1.
Contrary to what was expected, there appears to be very slight if any
correlation.
It can be seen from Figure 1 that the majority of the funds sampled
pay annually between .40 and .55 percent of their net assets as manage-
ment compensation. The four funds which paid the least for management
had net assets of $17.2 million (Whitehall Fund), $103.7 million (Bul-
lock Fund), $140.6 million (Century Shares Trust) and $81.5 million (In-
vestment Trust of Boston) respectively. The two which paid the most had
net assets of $12.6 million (Value Line Fund) and $23.5 million (Elec-
tronics Investment Corporation) respectively, while those companies pay-
ing the most tend to support the expectation that there is an inverse
relationship between management compensation and fund size a those paying
the least tend to refute it. The remaining twenty- four funds fail to
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Based on the evidence provided by this sample, the conclusion is
that there is no consistent relationship throughout the industry between
mutual fund size and management compensation. The reasons for a fund
paying management compensation which is high or low appear to depend
upon factors peculiar to the individual fund, which are not subject to
generalization. To demonstrate this, the six companies which were pre-
viously mentioned as constituting the extremes in Figure 1 have been
analyzed to determine the causes for their being in their respective
positions. The results are as follows:
1. Whitehall Fund . Whitehall's rate of management compensation
was by far the lowest of any company in the sample, even though they
were one of the smallest in size. It will be recalled from Chapter II
that Whitehall is one of the Broad Street Group of funds, which enjoy
the benefit of investment advisory service, at cost, through the Union
Service Corporation. This fact is the obvious reason for their extremely
low management compensation rate.
2. Bullock Fund . Bullock Fund is provided services by Calvin Bul-
lock, Ltd., its investment adviser, at a rate of only 0.25 percent per
annum. This is about one-half the industry average. Calvin Bullock;,
Ltd. manages several funds and have therefore been able to achieve cer-
tain economies of operation, which they have chosen to pass on t© their
clients in the form of low«r management fees.
3. Century Shares Trust . The affairs of this company are managed
by a board of six trustees, a somewhat uncommon arrangement in the in-
dustry. As a trust , they have avoided some of the expenses inherent in
the more common investment adviser/ investment company relationship. The
rate of remuneration to the trustees is therefore only 0.25 percent per

39
annum; like Bullock, considerably below the industry norm.
4. Investment Trust of Boston . This company, like Century, is
also managed through a board of trustees. The trustees are paid an an-
nual rate of 0.50 percent, twice that ©f Century, but under the terms of
the declaration of trust, this fee is reduced by all indebtedness of the
Trust. Additionally, during fiscal year 1964, by special vote of the
trustees, the compensation to the trustees and members of the advisory
board was limited to 0.29 percent. Otherwise, the rate would have been
in excess of 0.40 percent.
5. Value Line Fund . This fund had unusually high management ex-
pense because of the compensation rate it agreed upon in its management
contract. Its contract called for a rate of 0.75 percent per annum on
the first $4 million of the average of the daily closing net asset val-
ues and 0.50 percent of those in excess of $4 million, with certain pro-
visions for slight downward adjustments. Due to its small size, the
0.75 percent rate applied to approximately one-third of its holdings,
and the best it could do on the remaining two- thirds was about the in-
dustry average.
6. Electronics Investment Corporation . This company's advisory
contract called for a graduated fee rate beginning at 0.50 percent,
economies being realized at $90 million of net assets and again at $150
million of net assets. Due to its small size, it got neither of these
economies, and when the fees paid to directors and advisory board mem-
bers were added to those for the advisory service, the management compen-
sation rate was elevated above twenty-eight of the thirty funds sampled.
The lack of correlation between these variables in the random sample
of thirty companies prompted a further investigation in which six of the

40
largest mutual funds, each having over $800 million in net assets , were
studied. Table X contains the data recorded. These data indicate that
Massachusetts Investor's Trust had management expenses of only 0.07
percent--by far the lowest of any company studied. Affiliated Fund and
Wellington Fund had management expenses of 0.22 percent and 0.24 percent
respectively; well below the industry average (see Figure 1). The re-
maining three companies (Dreyfus Fund, Fundamental Investors and United
Accumulative) had rates which were just slightly under the average rate.
All of these companies had graduated fee scales except Dreyfus.
Massachusetts Investor's Trust had extremely low rates within each gradu-
ation, by virtue of its trust character. Affiliated and Wellington also
had low rates within each graduation, but not comparable to Massachusetts
Investor's Trust. The graduated fee scales of Fundamental Investors and
United Accumulative were not as attractive, however, in that their rates
within the lower graduations were about equal to the industry average,
and those in higher graduations were only slightly reduced. Dreyfus
charged a fee based on a flat percentage of the average market value of
its net assets, which was near the low end of the industry average.
The study of these six giant companies again demonstrates that man-
agement compensation is not significantly related to company size. This
is evident in the great disparity of rates between these companies. It
does indicate, however, that graduated fee scales become highly advan-
tageous to the shareholder where net assets are extremely large. This
is particularly noticeable when the management contract is written in
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V. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MUTUAL FUND SIZE
AND OTHER OPERATING EXPENSES
To determine and illustrate what, if any, relationship existed be-
tween the variables mutual fund size and other operating expenses (as
defined at the beginning of this chapter), a scatter diagram,, utilizing
appropriate data from Table IX was constructed. It is presented as
Figure 2.
While there was little correlation existing between fund size and
management compensation, there was, as expected, a definite correlation
between size and other operating expenses. The correlation was negative.
The tendency was for large values on the X axis (other operating ex-
penses) to be paired with small values on the Y axis (net assets) and
conversely, for large values on the Y axis to be paired with small val-
ues on the X axis. This, of course, shows that as assets increase, it
costs the shareholder less, per dollar invested, in other operating ex-
penses. This conclusion is dramatically supported by the study of the
six giant funds. Table X shows that other operating expenses, as a per-
centage of net assets, was extremely low for all these companies; vary-
ing from a low of 0.06 percent to a high of only 0.10 percent.
Thus we may conclude that the general tendency in the mutual fund
industry is for the larger companies to be most attractive to the pros-
pective shareholder, from the standpoint of other operating expenses he
will have to pay per dollar of his investment.
Considerable attention has been centered on management compensation
and other operating expenses as percentages of net assets. To the casual
observer, the significance of these figures may not be grasped „ in that,
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forcefully illustrate the impact that these two expense categories can
have upon the profits realized by the shareholder from his investment
,
the data in columns 8 and 9 of Table IX were computed. They are; (1)
management compensation as a percentage of investment income and (2)
other operating expense as a percentage of investment income , respec-
tively.
The extreme examples were Winfield Growth Industries and Whitehall
Fund. The former paid 34 percent of its investment income for manage-
ment compensation and an additional 26 percent of it for other operating
expenses. This amounts to the staggering sum of 60 percent of invest-
ment income , which was required to cover the expense of operating the
company. On the other hand, Whitehall managed to operate at a cost of
only 7 percent of investment income to the shareholder.
These figures can be misleading in that the two funds cited have
widely divergent objectives and investment policies. Whitehall puts pri-
mary emphasis on income and stability and seeks this objective through a
balanced portfolio. In contrast, Winfield stresses growth through a
widely diversified common stock portfolio. For this reason s Whitehall's
return on investment in the form of income will naturally be relatively
much larger than Winfield' s. And there will therefore be considerable
disparity between the relationship of their total operating expenses to
investment income. Further, we have not considered capital appreciation,,
which should significantly improve Winfield 's position relative to
Whitehall's.
These factors notwithstanding, the point is that ownership of mutual
fund shares is expensive , and the reader, when dealing with expenses
measured in fractions of percentages, should not overlook this fact.

CHAPTER IV
THE RELATIONSHIP OF MUTUAL FUND PERFORMANCE
TO MANAGEMENT COMPENSATION
The main investment service that mutual funds purport to provide to
1
the fund investor is security analysis. They provide this service, in
the vast majority of cases , by purchasing it from a management company.
Considerable effort was expended in Chapter III In attempting to estab-
lish that, when the funds purchase this service from the management com-
pany, in behalf of the investor, the price they pay is not inconsequen-
tial. In view of this, it is certainly reasonable for the investor to
ask what he is getting for this fee.
Chapter III also illustrated the great variance in management com-
pensation rates currently being paid by funds throughout the industry.
One assumes, in most situations, that a difference in service fee means
a difference in service. And the expectation is that fees vary directly
and, to a considerable degree, in proportion to that service. The share-
holder certainly has a right to expect that if he is going to have to
pay a higher fee, he should get better service. But how do we measure
whether the service provided by one management company is better than
that provided by another? It is generally accepted that the best measure
of this factor is the long-run performance of the fund which is receiv-
ing the service, in that the better the fund performs, the higher the
2
remuneration to the stockholder.
Marshall D. Ketchum, "Discussion; Mutual Fund Management Fee Rates,"
The Journal of Finance , XVIII (May, 19b3), 394.
"Forbes Mutual Fund Survey; 19b4," Forbes




This chapter will investigate and determine the relationships if
any, which exists between the performance of a fund and the compensation
it pays to secure that performance. In the process, other related mat-
ters will be touched upon. As in Chapter III, this will be accomplished
through statistical sampling and correlation. The variables to be cor-
related are management compensation and performance.
I. DESIGNING THE SAMPLE
In devising a sampling plan, all companies were classified on the
basis of investment objective. Perhaps the most commonly recognized
categorization of investment companies, on the basis of objective,, is;
(1) growth of capital and/or income, (2) immediate income, (3) price sta-
3bility or some combination of these three. Investment companies are
further classified on the basis of the investment policies that they fol-
4
low in the interest of achieving their declared objective(s). They are;
1. Diversified Common Stock Funds. Companies which invest alls, or
almost all, the money under their control in common stocks or in other
securities with common stock characteristics.
2. Specialized Common Stock Funds . Companies which place special
emphasis in their accounts on a particular industry or group of related
industries, such as various forms of energy, chemicals s electronics or
insurance.
3. Balanced Funds . Companies that at all times invest some por-
tion of their assets in bonds or preferred stocks, or both, in addition
•*Arthur Wiesenberger , Investment Companies , Mutual Funds and Other





to a portion that is invested in common stocks.
^* Flexibly Diversified Funds . Companies which may invest entirely
in common stocks or use any desired proportion of bonds and preferred
stocks.





or a combination of the two.
For purposes of this study , it was decided to concentrate on two
groups of funds s (1) those with growth objectives (the diversified com-
mon stock companies) and (2) those with multiple objectives of growth,
income and stability (the balanced companies). By doing this, the analy-
sis was simplified somewhat
s
while still including a considerable propor-
tion of all funds. The latter point is substantiated by the data pre-
sented in Table XI. They reflect that in fiscal year 19b3, diversified
common stock and balanced funds, from the standpoint of net assets, con-
stituted 84 percent of all funds in the industry.
It will be recalled from Chapter III that the grouping that has
just been described actually constitutes the definition of strata. In
this case, the universe from which the sample was to be taken consisted
of a stratum of diversified common stock companies and a stratum of bal-
anced companies. In contrast to the stratified proportional random
sampling used previously, it was decided that stratified equal-size ran-
dom sampling would be used in this instance, when using this sampling
procedure, independent samples are made from each stratum of the uni-
verse and then combined to make one sample, just as in proportional samp-
ling. It differs from proportional sampling in that the independent
samples are of equal size, no attempt being made to relate the total
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sample proportions to those of the universe.
The decision to sample on an equal- size basis was predicated on the
conclusion that performance analysis would be better served by this pro-
cedure. It was further decided that twenty companies would constitute
the sample; ten from each of the strata upon which we were concentrating,
The same table of random numbers which was used in Chapter III was again
used for making the selection.
TABLE XI
MUTUAL FUND ASSETS BY TYPES
(000 Omitted)
Type of Fund Total Net Assets % of Total
12/31/63
Diversified Common Stock $15,572,317 60%
Industry Specialized 2,347,008 9
Balanced 6,277,164 24
Income 906,773 3
Tax-Free Exchange 565,000 2
Canadian and International 295,241 1
Bond and Preferred Stock 196,907 1
Source: Arthur Wiesenberger and Company
II. MEASURING MUTUAL FUND PERFORMANCE
The determination of a method for measuring mutual fund performance
proved to be a somewhat difficult task. It was concluded that there is
no one absolute measure of this variable. This conclusion corresponds
to the findings of the Wharton Report:
Morris J. Slonim, Sampling in a Nutshell (New York: Simon
Schuster, 1960), p. 50.
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It is clear from the variety of investment objectives announced
by the funds that a single measure of performance for all funds and
for all investors is inadequate. There is no strong reason, for
example
s why a balanced fund should record s or be expected to
record, changes in asset values similar to those of a common stock
fund. Similarly it is to be expected that funds which announce an
"income" objective will yield different rates of return and will
experience different changes in asset values from funds with a
"growth" objective.
The best comparison was required, however, and it necessitated con-
sideration of several factors;
1. Over what length period should the survey extend? And when
should the period, once its length was established, begin, and when
should it end? The problem in selecting the period was to avoid, as
much as possible, bias in favor of either of the two groups of funds be-
ing considered. The presumption is that should a period be selected in
which stocks were predominately rising, the managers of diversified com-
mon stock funds would be favored, due to their exclusive investment in
growth securities. On the other hand, should the period be one of pre-
dominately falling stock prices, the balanced fund managers would have
the advantage, through their substantial commitment to bonds and pre-
ferred stocks. The reason for both circumstances, of course, is because
growth securities are usually volatile, while bonds and preferred stocks,
due to their lack of growth potential, are provided with features which
offer considerable protection to the investor in a declining market.
2. It has been previously mentioned in this paper that when an in-
vestment is made in mutual fund stock (except for a few "no-load" funds),
U. S., House of Representatives, A Study of Mutual Funds , 87th
Congress, 2d Session, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, H.R.
2274 (1962), p. 17.
-^Sidney M. Robbins, Managing Securities (New York? Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1954), pp. 145, 243.

50
a sales or load charge, that normally varies between 7 and 9 percent of
the original investment, is assessed. The value of the stock actually
purchased is, of course, reduced by this amount. The question to be re-
solved was whether to consider the load charge in computing management
results.
3. How should the payments to stockholders by the fund be handled?
There are two types of payments that may be made to investors: (1) divi-
dends paid out of current income and (2) distributions paid out of real-
o
ized capital gains. A performance measure is significantly affected by
whether these payments are treated as reinvested. A fund reinvesting
them should show better results than one whose investors received them
in cash.
A ten year period, from 1 January 1954 through 31 December 1963,
was selected for the study. Ten years was considered sufficiently long
to dampen the effects that any short term circumstances might have had
on management results. Of more importance, however, was that during the
particular period selected, there were four intervals in which the mar-
ket showed steady rises and three in which there were steady declines.
9
The intervals referred to are:
1. Rising
a. 1 January 1954-30 June 1956
b. 25 October 1957-31 December 1959
c. 30 September 1960-31 December 1961
Q
Lester V. Plum and Joseph H. Humphrey, Jr., Investment Analysis
and Management (Homewood, Illinois; Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1954),
p. 592.
o
"Forbes Mutual Fund Survey: 1964," loc . cit .
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d. 30 June 1962-31 December 1963
2. Declining
a. 30 June 1957-25 October 1957
b. 31 December 1959-30 September 1960
c. 1 January 1962-30 June 1962
Even though the aggregate length of the rising periods substantially
exceeded that of the declining periods, there was a decided tendency for
the two to balance the relative advantages of the diversified common
stock funds over the balanced funds, and vice-versa. The fact cannot be
avoided , however, that the Dow-Jones Industrial Average stood at 280.90
10
at the beginning of the period and had risen to 762.95 at the end. For
this reason, the conclusion is unavoidable that the diversified common
stock funds, on the whole, had the advantage.
In spite of this, the decision in favor of the period chosen Is not
undermined, because it was almost as well balanced as any other period
in recent history, and it had the advantage that it represented the most
current data available.
It was decided that the load charge would be ignored. The reason for
cfais was that the intention of the analysis was to measure management
skill; not investment results. Had the interest lay in investment re-
sults, the load charge would have been pertinent. The higher the per-
centage of an investment which is assessed as a load charge , the less of
that investment which is used for the actual purchase of stock. For that
reason, the load charge has a significant inverse effect upon investment
•Vail Street Journal, Pacific Coast Edition
,
January 3 S 1954 s p. 6
and January 3, 1964, p. 9.
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results; the higher it is, the more it acts to reduce the investment re-
sult. Measurement of management skill, on the other hand, is concerned
only with the amount of money which actually goes to purchase stock;
since it is a function of the appreciation or depreciation of this sum.
It was decided that dividends from investment income would be re-
garded as received by the investor in cash; since this is the common
practice. On the other hand, about seventy percent of recent capital
gains distributions have been paid in shares, which, of course, repre-
11
sents a reinvestment of the distribution. For this reason, it was de-
cided to regard them as reinvested.
In recapitulation, the decisions regarding the determination of
mutual fund performance were:
1. To measure performance over a ten year period, beginning on
1 January 1954 and ending on 31 December 1963*
2. To ignore the load charge.
3. To regard investment dividends as having been received by the
investor in cash.
4. To regard capital gains distributions as having been reinvested
in additional shares.
As a result of these decisions, the data, after they had been col-
lected, were suitable for measuring performance through the use of the
method favored by Wiesenberger. He determines performance of an indi-
12









the fund's capital gain (loss) performance and that of the broadly repre-
sentative Standard and Poor's 500 Stock Average. The Important thing
to note is that performance results of a company vary, depending upon the
measure used, because the different measures are arrived at by different
procedures.
Before passing on to the section of this paper that deals with the
correlation of the variables, performance and management compensation,
it should be pointed out that there are several impediments to excellent
performance which are inherent in the operation of mutual funds.
The first of these is the constant sales effort that is made by
most companies. This effort brings in a steady flow of new capital which,
for the most part, must be invested regardless of how unattractive the
market may be. This is especially true when the market is rising rap-
idly, in that this is just when investor interest is the highest and the
sales effort therefore the more productive. And, generally speaking, it
is during these periods when security prices are the least attractive.
This is partially offset, over the long pull, by dollar cost averaging
(whereby the high costs in the rising market are reduced by averaging
with the low costs of the declining market), but it still acts as a hin-
drance to any dramatic demonstration of performance.
Paradoxically, the large size of many companies, which they all
strive for, also acts as a brake in two ways: (1) it may lead to over-
diversification and (2) the company's flexibility to move in and out of
"Forbes Mutual Fund Survey: 1964," loc . cit.
Leo Barnes, Your Buying Guide to Mutual Fund
panies (Larchmont, New York; American Research Council, 1958), p. 7.
s and Investment Com-
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Asset value on 31 December 19b3 of $10,000 Investment
made on 1 January 1954, Including the value of shares
accepted as capital gains distributions $25,714
Plus total dividends received from investment income
during the period 1 January 1954-31 December 1963 6,162
Total adjusted asset value 31 December 1963 31,876
Asset value on 1 January 1954
. 9,150
Calculation
Formula Actual Figures Performance Relative
348%1963 Adjusted Asset Value . 31,876 _
1 January 1954 Asset Value 9,150
Performance * 248% Gain
It should be recognized that the selection of the Wiesenberger
method was an arbitrary choice and that it was actually made prior to
the five basic decisions regarding performance which have just been dis-
cussed. Otherwise, the data, after collection and compilation, might
well have been in a form that was not compatible with this method; or
with any method. Performance could just as well have been measured by
one of several other acceptable methods currently in use in financial
circles. One example of these other measures is the one used by Hugh
Johnson and Company. It is identical to the one used by Wiesenberger
except that It treats capital distributions as received by the investor
13
in cash. Another is the Forbes performance rating. It really con-
sists of two ratings for the investment company, one in rising markets
and one in declining markets. Both ratings are actually ratios between
13Johnson's Investment Company Charts (Buffalo: Hugh Johnson & Com-
pany, Inc., 1964), p. 5.

55
the market on short notice is impaired.
The objectives and investment policies of the funds themselves may
preclude the desired performance. For example, those companies which
have restricted policies or which specialize in securities of one or a
few industries often experience difficult times when these industries
lose their investor appeal.
A last factor hindering achievement is evident in periods of dras-
tic market decline. The threat of an increased redemption rate requires
that the manager make allowance for this by increasing the company's
liquid position. This liquidity decreases the return on the portfolio,
because those investments which are the most liquid are the least profit-
able.
III. COMPUTATION OF PERTINENT DATA
After the sample had been taken, the prospectuses, for fiscal year
1963, for all companies selected, were secured. The net asset valuation
of and management compensation paid by each company during 1963 were de-
termined. Management compensation, as a percentage of net assets, was
16
computed for each company. The Wiesenberger performance measure, which
was described earlier in this chapter, was then determined for each com-
pany for the ten year period. This was done by referring to the tables
Management compensation for these companies over a longer period
of time, say five years, would have been preferred. This would have off-
set any unusual circumstances that may have occurred for a particular
company in 1963, which might have caused its management compensation
rate to be higher or lower than normal. Unfortunately, the data for de-
termining it over a five year period were not available. It was decided
therefore to use the compensation paid in 1963 (the last year of the
period being analyzed) on the premise that it was the most representa-
tive which could be obtained.
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provided for this purpose in the 1964 edition of Wiesenberger's publica-
tion entitled Investment Companies
,
Mutual Funds and Other Types,
results are presented in Table XII.
IV. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MUTUAL FUND PERFORMANCE
AND MANAGEMENT COMPENSATION
To determine what, if any, relationship existed between the vari-
ables, performance and management compensation, a scatter diagram, utiliz-
ing appropriate data from Table XII, was constructed. The diagram is
presented as Figure 3. It can be seen that there is no correlation be-
tween these variables.
In the case of the diversified common stock funds, Massachusetts In-
vestor's Growth Stock Fund, National Investor's Corporation and Chemical
Fund had the lowest compensation rates, yet were at the top in performance
for the group. But T. Rowe Price Growth Stock Fund and Television-Elec=
tronics Fund were also at the top, and they had high management compensa-
tion rates. No pattern seemed to emerge.
Similarly, the same confused situation appeared to exist in the case
of the balanced funds. American Business Shares had the lowest perform-
ance of any company in the sample and paid a moderate management compen-
sation rate, but the George Putnam Fund of Boston had the same compensa-
tion rate but the highest performance of any of the balanced funds.
Diversified Investment Fund had a fairly high performance but a low com-
pensation rate.
It is concluded therefore that there is no relationships, of either
a positive or negative kind, between management compensation rates and
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Approximate peroent net change in net assets per share plus income dividends
and capital gains distributions. Capital gains distributions are reinvested
in additional shares. Inoeme dividens are treated as reoeived in cash.
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compensation currently being paid throughout the industry is not trace-
able to performance differentials. Generally speaking, it is just as
likely that the investor who pays a high rate for management compensa-
tion will get less service (as measured by performance) than his neighbor,




This paper has been concerned with the relationship between
end investment companies and their investment advisers.
Chapter I was devoted to a presentation of material related to mu-
tual funds that would provide a background for the study which was under-
taken in subsequent chapters. The history of the industry 9 from its in-
ception to the present, was traced, using appropriate statistical data.
The underlying reasons for the phenomenal growth that has been experienced
were examined. The advantages and disadvantages, which accrue to the in-
vestor in mutual funds, were discussed at length. During this discussion,
reasonable latitude was taken in referring to related matters in an
attempt to establish a broad base for the study. Chapter I was terminated
with a brief statement of the purpose and scope of the research effort.
Chapter II sought to further broaden the reader's understanding of
the mutual fund industry. It attempted to focus his attention on the
narrow area of the field with which the paper is concerned by making a
detailed analysis of the management of mutual funds. This analysis was
undertaken in two steps: (1) the legal relationship between the invest-
ment company and its investment adviser and (2) the actual procedures
which are commonly employed in controlling the fund portfolio.
The investigation into the legal relationship was initially directed
toward an examination of the more important provisions of the Investment
Company Act of 1940 which bear on the interface considerations ©f the
investment company and its adviser. It was then diverted into a pre-




The procedures for controlling the fund portfolio were presented
through a discussion of the organizational structure of and management
methods employed by two currently prominent and successful mutual fund
management companies. This completed the backgrounding phase of the
study.
The actual research phase was concerned with three primary areas of
interest relating to investment companies:
1. The relationship of their size to the management compensation
paid by them.
2. The relationship of their size to their other operating expenses.
3. The relationship of their performance to the management compen-
sation paid by them.
Chapter III investigated the first two of these areas. It explained
the necessity for separation of all operating expenses into two categor-
ies, management compensation and other operating expenses, and provided
a working definition of the two terms. It adopted the net asset valua-
tion of a company as the measure of its size.
The matter of mutual fund size was examined from the standpoint of
the legal restrictions of the Investment Company Act of 1940, which were
imposed for the protection of the shareholder.
It was not practicable to gather data to enable determination of
the variables in which we were interested for all investment companies.
Statistical sampling was selected as the alternative. Use of this device
required the design of a sampling procedure. The procedure selected was
stratified proportional random sampling. An explanation of this method
and the reasons for its selection were offered.
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A sample of thirty companies was drawn from a universe consisting
of 236. The prospectuses and annual reports for all companies in the
sample, for fiscal year 1964, were obtained. The required data were ex-
cerpted, and the aforementioned variables were computed.
The variables , size and management compensations were correlated by
means of a scatter diagram. Contrary to what was expected, there was
essentially no correlation of either a positive or negative nature. The
six companies in the sample which constituted the extremes were analyzed
in an attempt to gain additional insight into the reasons for the surpris-
ing results. The analysis strengthened the results of the correlation.
For the same reason, an additional study of the relationship between
size and management compensation was conducted on six of the largest com-
panies in the industry. It was felt that this would provide the most
favorable circumstances for the demonstration of any trend or pattern
which might exist. None materialized.
The last section of Chapter III was devoted to a correlation of the
variables, size and other operating expense, for the same thirty compan-
ies. It was also done by means of a scatter diagram. In contrast to
the findings regarding size and management compensation, a definite rela-
tionship was established between size and other operating expense; it was
an inverse relationship. There was a strong tendency for the larger com-
panies to incur smaller other operating expense per dollar of net assets.
Further analysis of the six giant companies, which were previously men-
tioned, clearly substantiated these findings.
In closing Chapter III, an attempt was made to emphasize to the
reader that management compensation and other operating expense are of
great significance to the shareholder, despite the small percentage of
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net. assets that they represent. This was done by showing these expenses
as percentages of investment income for the 30 companies in the sample.
The company with the highest total operating expense , as a percentage of
investment income, and the one with the lowest were given special atten-
tion. There were other factors which required consideration to prevent
these statistics from being misleading in certain respects. These were
discussed.
Chapter IV was concerned with the relationship between performance
and management compensation. It was first necessary to decide upon a
procedure for selecting the sample of companies to be considered. The
one chosen was stratified equal-size random sampling. An explanation of
this method and the reasons for its selection were given.
A procedure for determination of management compensation was of n®
concern in that it had already been developed in the preceding chapter.
Determination of performance, however, required consideration of and de-
cisions regarding several factors. These factors were discussed in deptl
in an attempt to insure a thorough understanding of the difficulties In-
volved in measuring performance and the basis for the use of the particu=
lar measure which was chosen. Also, the impediments to superior perform*
ance that the investment adviser encounters were discussed.
A sample of 20 companies was drawn from a universe confined to
diversified common stock and balanced companies. The prospectuses and
annual reports for all companies in the sample, for fiscal year 1963 s
were obtained. The required data were excerpted, and the management com=
pensation for each company was computed. The performance measure for
each, for the period previously decided upon, was ascertained by refer-
ence to special tables prepared by Arthur Wiesenberger and
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These variables were then correlated by means of a scatter diagram.
It had appeared reasonable to expect that there was a definite direct
relationship between the performance of a company and the compensation
which it paid to its investment adviser. There was, however, no correla-
tion of either a positive or negative nature. No pattern or trend could
be seen.
The most significant findings of this research effort, as they re-
late to the mutual fund industry as a whole, are therefore threefold:
1. The compensation which is paid by an investment company to its
investment adviser bears no relationship whatsoever to the size of the
fund.
2. A pronounced inverse relationship does exist between mutual fund
size and other operating expense.
3. The performance that an investment adviser is able to achieve
for an investment company is completely independent of the compensation
rate which it receives from the investment company in payment for that
service.
These findings should be very disturbing to the mutual fund share-
holder. They raise two highly pertinent questions to which he should be
demanding answers:
1. Why is it that management fee rates that are established when
investment companies are small remain stable as the companies' assets
increase enormously, even though the cost of managing the companies does
not go up proportionately? This becomes a particularly pressing question




in view of the relationship which was found between fund size and other
operating expense. This finding clearly demonstrates that there are
economies of scale in the mutual fund industry and that the investment
companies are realizing the benefits of these economies in those in-
stances where they pay for their actual operating expenses directly. It
strongly suggests that the rates currently being charged a considerable
proportion of the investment companies are excessive.
2. Why is it that an investment adviser is paid for superior man-
agement achievement (as measured by the performance of the investment
company), year after year, regardless of whether he provides it?
Until recently, there seemed to be little general concern over these
matters. However, in the last five years, things have changed. This is
evidenced by the rash of stockholder suits charging excessive
2
fee rates which have been filed. Almost all of these suits., s<
have been settled on the basis of the "sliding scale," whereby the rates
3
for advice fall after assets rise above a specified amount.
The Securities and Exchange Commission agrees with the shareholder
in his views. Some of its staff officials feel that even the adoption
of a sliding scale is not adequate to correct the imbalance now exist-
4
ing. They undoubtedly have been strongly influenced in this matter by
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While the tide is now definitely running against those investment
advisers who are charging unconscionable management fee rates, a final
solution of the problem is not yet in sight. Edward S. Herman, one of
the authors of the Wharton Report, has reflected upon this matter at
length, and it is his view that, currently, the most promising approach
is the enactment of federal legislation to require each mutual fund to
6
be internally managed; that is, outlaw external management companies.
He feels that the forms of control do not accurately describe the facts
of power and that mutual funds are actually corporate shells, serving as
controlled instrumentalities of investment advisers. He considers this
inimical to the interests of the mutual fund shareholder and the primary
reason for the current inequity in management fee rates.
There would be, of course, violent opposition by the management com-
panies and their shareholders to any such action. There is no reason to
believe, at this time, that the Securities and Exchange Commission is
contemplating a recommendation for this proposal. Its Division of Cor-
porate Regulation is, however, currently conducting an examination of
mutual funds, in an attempt to formulate some judgements on questions
such as these. Their findings should be forthcoming in the near future.
Regardless of the outcome, it will be interesting to follow what
promises to be a hotly contested battle over mutual fund management fee
rates and their relation to fund size and performance. Perhaps this re-
search effort may, in a small way, contribute something to its resolu-
tion. It would be pleasant to think that it might.
^Edward S. Herman, "Mutual Fund Management Fee Rates," The Journal
of Finance
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